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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the end of the cold war a lot of things have changed in the 
international relations in the entire world. The profound changes initiated a 
process of transformation both in NATO and EU. The tragic events of 
September 11th had a further strong influence on the desire of both 
organizations to adapt to the new environment. Meanwhile the relations of 
these two most important organizations of the political West have been the 
subject in the center of many analyses.  In essence, the end of the Cold War 
profoundly changed the central parameters of the relationship between 
Europe and the US. The developments in the Western Balkans have been very 
important in shaping the EU-NATO relations to be more defined. The 
following paper will examine the Integration process of Western Balkans and 
under the influence of transatlantic relations.  
 
 
 
THE NATO-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
 
NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests. 
Both organizations consult and work together to prevent and resolve crises 
and armed conflicts, In a spirit of complementarily.  
The decision to cooperate on security issues goes back to 24 January 2001 
when the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency exchanged letters 
defining the scope of cooperation and the modalities of consultation between 
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the two organizations.16 Cooperation has accelerated ever since, in particular 
with the signing of the landmark “NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP” 
(European Security and Defense Policy), which paved the way for the 
adoption of the Berlin-Plus arrangements. 
 
The “NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP” 
 
Agreed on 16 December 2002, the “NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP” 
reaffirmed the EU assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for its own 
military operations. It also reiterated the following political principles of the 
strategic partnership: 
- effective mutual consultation 
- equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of 
the European Union and NATO; 
- respect for the interests of EU and NATO members states;  
- respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; And 
coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military 
capability requirements common to the two organizations. ;17 
 
 
The Berlin-Plus Arrangements 
 
Following the political decision of December 2002, the Berlin- Plus 
arrangements were adopted on 17 March 2003 (through an exchange of 
letters covering 14 agreed documents). They provide the basis for NATO-EU 
cooperation in crisis management by allowing EU access to NATO’s 
collective assets and capabilities for EU led operations. In effect, they allow 
                                                 
16 Burwell, G. Frances, Gompert, c. David, Policy Paper, March 2006, Transatlantic Transformation: Building a 
NATO-EU security Architecture, pp. 15 
 
17 DeCAMP, William S., ESDP: NATO’s demise or opportunities for NATO?, USAWS Strategy research Project, 
18 march 2005, pp. 79 
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the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not 
engaged. They consist of the following major elements: 
- A NATO-EU Security Agreement (covers the exchange of classified 
information under reciprocal security protection rules);  
- Assured EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities for actual use in the 
military planning of EU-led crisis management operations;  
- Availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as 
communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management 
operations;  
- Procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and 
capabilities; 
- Terms of Reference for NATO’s Deputy SACEUR - who in principle will be 
the operation commander of an EU-led operation under the Berlin-Plus 
arrangements (and who is always a European) - and European Command 
Options for NATO;  
- NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU led crisis 
management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities;  
- Incorporation within NATO’s long-established defense planning system, of 
the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military 
operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-equipped forces trained 
for either NATO-led or EU-led operations. 18 
 
 
 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT, NATO FIRST 
 
There need to be wholehearted, unambiguous European adherence to the 
principle of “where NATO as a whole is not engaged, “ and political processes 
should be developed to ensure that no doubts arise about this point or about 
NATO’s ability, sufficiently early in a crisis, to make such a determination. 
Many Europeans will resist the notion that this implies “NATO first”: But as a 
                                                 
18 DeCAMP, William S., ESDP: NATO’s demise or opportunities for NATO?, USAWS Strategy research Project, 
18 march 2005, pp. 83 
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practical matter, it is important for preserving cohesion of the alliance. 
Securing this goal, which is important to the United States, will probably have 
to come from day-to-day consultations, including close cooperation between 
the North Atlantic Council, the EU’s Political and Security Committee, and 
permanent, day-to-day liaison arrangements between the two; but it requires 
a shared vision and political commitment on all sides.19 
 
In short, US reluctance to share the risks and tasks, especially in the Balkans, 
the most serious area of instability in today’s Europe, would be incompatible 
with the effort to keep the Security and defense policy of EU (ESDP) as 
simply a second-choice option for dealing with crisis and conflict in Europe. 
 
 
The 1999 Campaign 
 
The Serbian genocide had reached at a high level which had made the 
Kosovars to establish (UÇK) LKA against Serbian Army. But the situation had 
worsened by many civilian killed and many Kosovo’s villages and cities burned. 
Javier Solana directed NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 
General Wesley Clark to initiate air operations in Yugoslavia. The militarian 
operation of NATO in spring 1999 against Yugoslavia was called Operation 
Allied Force. 
 NATO launched military operations because everything else failed and it 
was clear that the diplomatic track would not deliver a solution, whilst at the 
same time the humanitarian situation on the ground had become worse to such 
an extent that outside intervention became essential in order to prevent a 
humanitarian catastrophe. 
  “Targets for air strikes were selected by the NATO Military Authorities, 
acting in accordance with guidance agreed by the North Atlantic Council on 
                                                 
19
 Hunter, E. Robert, The European Security and Defence Policy NATO’s Companion   or Competitor?, pp. 149. 
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broad sets of targets and the requirement to minimise collateral damage. The 
North Atlantic Council was not involved in the detailed process of target 
selection. Individual Allies were responsible for the clearance of the targets 
assigned to them by NATO.”20 The Allies hoped that the air operation would be 
short, and that Milosevic would again, as he had in the past, back down when 
confronted with the threat or use of force.  
But this time it was different so operations were intensified to increase the 
pressure on Milosevic, his regime and his forces in order to achieve NATO’s 
objectives. It would have been possible at any time for Milosevic to bring the air 
operation to an end by withdrawing his forces from Kosovo. “The initial phase of 
the air operation was designed to degrade the Yugoslav Integrated Air Defence 
System, the Serbia Command and Control infrastructure, airfields and aircraft 
and deployed heavy weapons in Kosovo. The subsequent phase widened the 
operation to include targets of high military value across Yugoslavia.”21 This 
Campaign lasted 89 days in the end of which the US plan and objective were 
realized. During this campaign NATO proved itself to be a capable and effective 
crisis management organisation and that EU partners must work together with 
NATO Allies to improve their capabilities through the Defence Capabilities 
Initiative and the European Headline Goal. This will increase their ability to act 
and strengthen Europe’s partnership with the US.  
 
 
EU FOCUSES ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS 
 
NATO membership for the most part of the European countries has been one 
step before the EU membership. In fact, we can claim that EU membership 
process needs more time and longer way comparing with that of NATO. The 
enlargement of EU and NATO is commented sometime as a kind of 
                                                 
20 NATO'S Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, Benjamin S. Lambeth, RAND 
publications, pp. 35. 
 
21
 NATO'S Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, Benjamin S. 
Lambeth, RAND publications, pp.58. 
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competition. This occurs that both of them during the last two decades are 
orientated towards the East and Southeast Europe.  But when we take the 
cases we easily understand that the manner two organizations proceeds is 
different.   
The Kosovo is a good example where NATO was ahead during the 
crisis management and afterwards EU has been active in the time afterward. 
It should be emphasized that the role of EU has been very important to put 
rule of law in Kosovo in cooperation with US Department of Justice and also 
has been very important to keep equilibrium of Serbia by having different 
negotiation to give as an objective the EU membership. 22 
 
 
WESTERN BALKANS GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE COOPERATION 
 
Operation Concordia 
On 31 March 2003, the EU-led Operation Concordia took over the 
responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the 
Republic of Macedonia. This mission was the first in which NATO assets 
were made available to the European Union.  
 
In line with the Berlin-Plus arrangements, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (DSACEUR) was appointed as Operation Commander 
of this first ever EU-led military peacekeeping mission. 
NATO supported the European Union on strategic, operational and tactical 
planning. An EU-Operation Headquarters (OHQ) was set-up at NATO’s 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, to 
assist the Operation Commander. In addition, an “EU Command Element” 
(EUCE) was established at AFSOUTH in Naples, Italy, which is the NATO 
Joint Force command for Balkan operations (since mid-2004 it is called the 
Joint Force Command Headquarters (JFC HQ), Naples. At the time, the 
Chief of Staff of AFSOUTH also became Chief of Staff of the new EU 
Command Element, assisted by an EU Director for Operations. These dual 
                                                 
22
 Pond, Elizabeth, The EU’s Test in Kosovo, The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2008, pp 
97-112 
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NATO-EU posts guaranteed the linkage between the European Union’s and 
NATO’s operational chain of command during Concordia. 
Concordia was terminated on 15 December 2003 and replaced by Proxima, 
an EU-led police mission, which was completed on 14 December 2005. 
 
 
Operation Althea 
 
Building on the results of Concordia and following the conclusion of the 
NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), the 
European Union deployed a new mission called Operation Althea on 2 
December 2004. The EU force (EUFOR) operates under Berlin-Plus 
arrangements, drawing on NATO planning expertise and on other Alliance’s 
assets and capabilities. The NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe is the Commander of Operation Althea and there is also an EU 
Operation Headquarters (OHQ) located at SHAPE. The entire NATO chain 
of command is in fact used. On the same day as the transition to an EU-led 
mission, NATO established a NATO Military Liaison and Advisory Mission 
(NATO HQ Sarajevo) that complements the EU mission with specific NATO 
competencies. 
 
 
The Independence Proclamation of Kosovo and Afterwards 
Status talks for Kosovo started in February 2006. The talks were 
initially led by UN Special Envoy for Kosovo, the former Finnish President 
Martti Ahtisaari. After fourteen months of negotiations, Mr. Ahtisaari 
presented his Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement to the 
UN Secretary General in March 2007. On 1 August 2007, UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon launched an extended period of engagement with the 
parties led this time by the EU, Russia, US Troika under the auspices of the 
Contact Group. By the end of the Troika’s mandate on 10 December 2007, 
Belgrade and Pristina failed to reach any agreement on Kosovo’s future 
status. NATO supported the international process to determine the status of 
   51 
ICBS 2008
Kosovo from the start, including the efforts of President Ahtisaari and those 
of the Troika.  
After a long road of different initiatives to find a solution accepted by 
both Kosovo and Serbia there was clear that the realization of such a plan 
would be impossible. The General Secretary of UN said Marti Ahtisari to find 
the solution of the Kosovo. He after many negotiations and   meetings with 
parties prepared and proposed a draft to UN which was accepted by Kosovo 
but not by the Serbia. As a result Kosovo politicians decided to proclaim the 
independence of Kosovo.  
The 2008 Kosovo proclamation of independence was an act of the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government Assembly of Kosovo, adopted on 
17 February 2008 by unanimous quorum (109 members present), which 
declared Kosovo to be independent from Serbia.  
This decision was supported immediately by US and after that by 
France, UK and other European countries. The President of France Nicolas 
Sarkozy, this time preferred to be with US different from Chiraque’s view 
during Iraqi intervention, because he was aware of the future with the Kosovo 
which geographically is only some hundred of miles from Paris and Berlin. 
He also was aware that EU, presidency of which would belong to France only 
some months later, should be the decider in the future of the Balkans. The 
EULEX (EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) was the mission that EU sent to 
put the rule of law and to supervise the functioning of new born state. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The NATO membership of Albania and Croatia and especially 
Kosovo’s Independence brought the US and EU closer to each other. In July 
2003, the European Union and NATO published a «Concerted Approach for 
the Western Balkans», which outlined core areas of cooperation and 
emphasized the common vision and determination both organizations share 
to bring stability to the region. In the Balkans the cooperation of has been of a 
high importance during the last two decades.  About one decade ago the 
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common commitment of NATO and the EU prevented a civil war in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia23.  The EU took on policing tasks 
and NATO the military ones.  In Bosnia, on the other hand, the EU has been 
ensuring "hard" security while NATO concentrates on training the Bosnian 
armed forces24. In Kosovo, NATO remained militarily committed for some 
years.  But after the proclamation of Independence, the EU started acquiring 
a greater role there.  For that reason NATO and the EU, in cooperation, has 
played a decisive role in the situation of the Balkans. And in general the EU's 
policing tasks have been harmonized with NATO's military tasks. 
 The other side of EU- US/NATO cooperation has been in the aspect of EU 
and NATO enlargements. These two organizations have moved almost 
parallel towards the East and Southeast Europe. Although some 
commentators consider this as a kind of competition to conclude I say that 
these two organizations have been complementary to each other to be more 
effective and successful in Balkans and also in the other parts of the world. 
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 De HOOP SCHEFFER, Jaap, NATO and the EU: Time for a new Chapter, 
Keynotes speech by NATO secretary General, 29 January 2007 
24 De HOOP SCHEFFER, Jaap, NATO and the EU: Time for a new Chapter, Keynotes 
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